Hiroyasu Omura

Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences,Department of Business,Business CourseProfessor
Last Updated :2026/07/27

■Researcher basic information

Degree

  • Bachlor of Law, The University of Tokyo, Mar. 1988
  • Master of Law(Comparative Jurisprudence), New York University School of Law, May 2000
  • Master of Law(Corporate Law), New York University School of Law, May 2001

Research Keyword

  • Corporate Law
  • Stewardship Activities
  • Corporate Governance

Field Of Study

  • Humanities & social sciences, Civil law, Corporate Law
  • Humanities & social sciences, Civil law, Trust Law

■Career

Career

  • Apr. 2021 - Present
    Teikyo Heisei University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Professor
  • Apr. 1988 - Mar. 2021
    Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking Corporation

Educational Background

  • Aug. 2000 - May 2001, New York University School of Law, Corporate Law
  • Aug. 1999 - May 2000, New York University School of Law, Comparative Jurisprudence
  • Apr. 1983 - Mar. 1988, The University of Tokyo, Faculty of Law, Public Law (Faculty of Law)

■Research activity information

Paper

  • Stewardship, Fiduciary Duty, and the Cost Structure of Asset Management
    Hiroyasu Omura
    SSRN Electronic Journal, Apr. 2026
    This article reexamines the theory of stewardship from the perspective of institutional alignment among fiduciary duty, investment mandates, investment strategies, and the cost structures of asset managers. Recent debates on stewardship have largely focused on the growing influence of large institutional investors, particularly passive asset managers, and have framed stewardship as a normative question of whether such influence should be exercised more actively or constrained. However, these debates do not sufficiently explain the institutional and economic conditions that shape asset managers' behavior. Drawing on fiduciary law theory and the economics of asset management, this article argues that voting should be understood as a core obligation derived from the duty of loyalty, while engagement should be understood as a discretionary activity derived from the duty of care, the content of which should vary depending on investment mandates and cost-recovery structures. The article demonstrates that the uniform stewardship model embedded in stewardship codes creates institutional misalignment across investment 2 strategies and proposes a role-differentiated stewardship framework based on investment mandates as a foundation for institutional design.
  • The Mandate-fit Theory of Stewardship : Passive Investing and the Institutional Structure of Asset Management
    Hiroyasu Omura
    SSRN Electronic Journal, Apr. 2026
    <div> The rapid expansion of passive investing has reshaped debates on corporate governance and stewardship. Existing literature focuses on the growing influence of large index fund managers and advances competing normative arguments regarding whether their role should be strengthened or constrained. However, these debates largely overlook the institutional structure of asset management, including investment mandates and cost structures.&nbsp;</div><div> <br></div><div> This article develops the mandate-fit theory, which explains stewardship as the alignment between fiduciary duties, investment mandates, investment strategies, and cost structures. Voting is derived from the duty of loyalty, while engagement depends on the duty of care and the contractual mandate.&nbsp;</div><div> <br></div><div> The analysis shows that active and passive strategies generate different forms of stewardship. Active managers undertake firm-level engagement, whereas passive managers primarily conduct systematic stewardship through voting. These differences arise from the economic structure of asset management.&nbsp;</div><div> <br></div><div> The article argues that stewardship should not be understood as a uniform obligation. Instead, it should be viewed as an institutional outcome shaped by mandates, strategies, and cost structures, and calls for greater transparency in investment mandates.</div>
  • Corporate Governance in Capital Markets
    Hiroyasu Omura
    Springer Nature Switzerland, 25 Aug. 2025
  • コーポレートガバナンス改革後のスチュワードシップ活動とエー ジェンシー問題               
    Sep. 2020
  • 日本におけるコーポレートガバナンス改革の意義               
    Jun. 2020
  • What Does Japanese Corporate Governance Reform Mean?
    Hiroyasu Omura
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020

Books and other publications

Lectures, oral presentations, etc.

  • コーポレートガバナンス改革後のスチュワードシップ活動とエー ジェンシー問題               
    13 Sep. 2020, [Invited]

Affiliated academic society

  • May 2021 - Present
    European Corporate Governance Institute               
  • Nov. 2019 - Present
    Society for the Economic Studies of Securities               
  • Aug. 1993 - Present
    The Securities Analysts Association of Japan               

■University education and qualification information

Qualifications, licenses

  • 01 Sep. 1993
    Securities Analyst
  • 01 Nov. 1994
    Real Estate Notary
  • 01 Nov. 1995
    Book Keeping First Degree
  • 01 Nov. 2003
    Attorney admitted in New York State
  • 01 Nov. 2004
    Semi-first Degree Eiken